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OIL AND GAS LITIGATION UPDATE FOR THE
NORTH DAKOTA STATE COURTS
MARK D. CHRISTIANSEN *

ABSTRACT
In 2014, North Dakota encountered a wide variety of oil and gas
industry legal issues involving dealings between landowners and oil and gas
lessees and operators, the interpretation of oil and gas leases, surface use
rights, North Dakota’s abandoned mineral statutes, the status of claims for
unpaid royalties in bankruptcy, and alleged frivolous lawsuits. In many
instances, the facts of the particular case drove the outcome and rulings of
the court. However, these recent court decisions have further developed the
status of oil and gas law in the state.

* Mark D. Christiansen is an energy litigation attorney with the Oklahoma City office of
McAfee & Taft, a professional corporation.
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INTRODUCTION
The following decisions of the North Dakota Supreme Court, as well as
one example of the rulings issued by the federal district courts of North
Dakota, are indicative of the continuing growth of oil and gas litigation in
this state.
I.

NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT REVERSES SUMMARY
JUDGMENT RULING IN FAVOR OF OIL AND GAS LESSEE IN
SUIT BY MINERAL OWNERS FOR FRAUD IN THE
INDUCEMENT IN THE EXECUTION OF OIL AND GAS LEASES

In Golden Eye Resources, LLC v. Ganske,1 the mineral owners had
engaged in extensive negotiations with Golden Eye, which led to their
execution of oil and gas leases in favor of Golden Eye in December 2009.
On May 28, 2010, the mineral owners sent Golden Eye a notice of
rescission seeking to rescind the leases for fraud in the inducement on the
grounds that a series of representations Golden Eye allegedly made to the
mineral owners prior to their granting of the leases were false.2 The
mineral owners offered to return all payments to Golden Eye as part of the
proposed rescission.3
“Golden Eye sued [the mineral owners] to quiet title to the lease
interests and sought damages for breach of contract and intentional
interference with contract.”4
The mineral owners answered and
counterclaimed, seeking rescission or cancellation of the leases.5 On
multiple motions and cross-motions for summary judgment, the district
court rejected and dismissed all claims, except the court quieted title to the
leases in Golden Eye.6 The court found that certain representations
contradicted the terms of the leases and were therefore barred by the parole
evidence rule.7 It further found that “the remaining misrepresentations
constituted mere ‘sales talk,’ ‘puffery,’ or ‘opinion’ and were not material

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

2014 ND 179, 853 N.W.2d 544.
Id. ¶ 4, 853 N.W.2d at 548.
Id.
Id. ¶ 6.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 15, 853 N.W.2d at 550.
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to the [mineral owners’] fraudulent inducement claims.”8 Both the mineral
owners and Golden Eye appealed.9
The North Dakota Supreme Court found that the dispositive issue in
the appeal was “whether the district court erred in granting summary
judgment dismissing the [mineral owners’] claims they were fraudulently
induced into signing the leases by Golden Eye’s alleged
misrepresentations.”10 The court found that actual fraud is always a
question of fact, and that “because ‘intent to defraud and deceive is
ordinarily not susceptible of direct proof, fraud . . . may be inferred from the
circumstances at the time of the transaction.’”11
The mineral owners alleged that Golden Eye made a series of factual
misrepresentations to induce the mineral owners into leasing to Golden Eye
instead of another company. The district court’s order listed many of the
alleged representations, including the following:
1. That Golden Eye itself would drill the wells and develop the
[mineral owners’] minerals. . . .
4. That Golden Eye would drill the [mineral owners’] minerals as
soon as they obtained a drilling rig and would drill the [mineral
owners’] minerals first. . . .
6. That Golden Eye had acquired 7,000 net mineral acres in the
Tyrone Township, where the Defendants’ property is located, and
was developing that township. . . .
10. That Golden Eye had operating/drilling control over the
sections where the Defendants’ minerals were located. . . .12
The North Dakota Supreme Court began its analysis by recognizing
that, while the parol evidence rule “generally cannot be used to vary or
contradict the terms of a complete, written contract adopted as a definite
expression of the parties’ agreement,”13 parol evidence may be used by the
parties and considered by the court “when the written agreement does not
reflect the parties’ intent because of fraud, mistake, or accident.”14 The
court noted that this exception to the rule “applies even if the evidence
contradicts or conflicts with the terms of the written agreement.”15 The
8. Id.
9. Id. ¶ 1, 853 N.W.2d at 547.
10. Id. ¶ 9, 853 N.W.2d at 549.
11. Id. ¶ 11 (quoting Am. Bank. Ctr. v. Weist, 2010 ND 251, ¶ 12, 793 N.W.2d 172, 178).
12. Id. ¶ 13, 853 N.W.2d at 550.
13. Id. ¶ 17, 853 N.W.2d at 551.
14. Id.
15. Id. ¶ 18.
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court found that the mineral owners were not seeking to enforce the alleged
misrepresentations and oral promises, but were instead asking the court “to
entirely rescind the leases because of the fraudulent inducement.”16
Consequently, the parol evidence rule simply had no application to bar the
presentation of parol evidence in support of the mineral owners’ claims.17
With regard to the trial court’s finding that the remaining statements
relied upon by the mineral owners were mere sales talk, puffery or opinion,
the appellate court found “[t]he alleged misrepresentations in this case go
well beyond mere puffery, sales talk, or opinion, and specifically averred
past or present facts which Golden Eye allegedly knew to be untrue.”18 The
court distinguished predictions of future events that generally do not
constitute fraud.19 The court found that the trial court erred in disregarding
the alleged misrepresentations as being either impermissible parol evidence
or as being puffery or the like that was immaterial to the mineral owners’
claims for fraudulent inducement.20 It reversed the summary judgment
rulings of the trial court and remanded the case for further proceedings
consistent with the opinion.21
II. NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT INTERPRETS THE
INTERPLAY BETWEEN THE DRILLING OPERATIONS CLAUSE
AND THE PUGH CLAUSE OF AN OIL AND GAS LEASE
In Tank v. Citation Oil & Gas Corp.,22 the court was presented with
Citation’s appeal of a district court summary judgment ruling in favor of
Tank quieting title to an oil and gas lease that described the leased premises
as being the northwest quarter and south half of section 10, township 151
north, range 96 west, McKenzie County, North Dakota.23 The oil and gas
lease at issue in the case was signed in 1982, and the history of oil and gas
activity described by the court commenced in May 1983.24 The court found
that two specific clauses contained in the oil and gas lease had the greatest
relevance to the issues in dispute between Citation and Tank. The “drilling
operations clause” provided:

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id. ¶ 21, 823 N.W.2d at 552.
Id.
Id. ¶ 24, 853 N.W.2d at 553.
Id. ¶ 25.
Id. ¶ 26.
Id.
2014 ND 123, 848 N.W.2d 691.
Id. ¶ 2, 848 N.W.2d at 694.
Id.
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Notwithstanding anything in this lease contained to the contrary, it
is expressly agreed that if Lessee shall commence operations for
drilling at any time while this lease is in force, this lease shall
remain in force and its terms shall continue so long as operations
are continuously prosecuted and, if production results therefrom,
then as long as production continues. As used in this lease
continuously prosecuted shall mean that not more than thirty days
shall elapse without operations on any well or that not more than
ninety days shall elapse between the completion or abandonment
of one well and the beginning of operations for the drilling of a
subsequent well.25
The court found this clause provided that the lease would remain in
force and effect as long as drilling operations were continuously prosecuted
and, if production resulted therefrom, then as long as production
continued.26
However, the oil and gas lease also contained a “Pugh clause,” which
the district court found “severed the lease allowing it to become divisible
and allowing the lease on the southwest quarter to expire.”27 The Pugh
clause provided as follows:
Nothwithstanding any provision in this lease to the contrary, if, at
the end of the one year period from the end of the primary term
hereof, this lease is maintained in full force and effect by virtue of
production of oil and/or gas, this lease shall nevertheless expire as
to all that part of said lands not included in a producing unit unless
operations for the drilling of a well have been conducted during
such one-year period. Lessee may continue to hold this lease in
full force and effect as to all of said lands for subsequent and
successive periods of one year by conducing [sic] additional
drilling operations on undeveloped portions of said lands during
each preceding one-year period. Should Lessee fail to conduct
drilling operations during any such one-year period, then this lease
shall expire as to said lands not included in producing units at the
end of the one-year period during which no drilling operations
were conducted. The term “producing unit” as used herein shall
mean the following number of acres:

25. Id. ¶ 12, 848 N.W.2d at 696.
26. Id.
27. Id. ¶ 14, 848 N.W.2d at 697.
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A. The number of acres in the drilling and spacing unit allocated to
each producing well as determined by the appropriate governing
body of the State of North Dakota.
B. In the absence of rules and regulations promulgated by the
appropriate state governing body, the number of acres in a
producing unit for each producing well shall be approximately one
hundred and sixty as to oil or six hundred forty as to gas.28
The district court ruled that the lease terminated as to the southwest
quarter by operation of the Pugh clause of the lease. Specifically, it found
(a) that the Pugh clause applied each successive one-year period after the
expiration of the primary terms of the lease, (b) that the only well in the
southwest quarter ceased producing on October 1, 2008, (c) that the drilling
of the new well in a new spacing unit that included the southwest quarter
commenced no earlier than October 30, 2009, and (d) none of the savings
clauses of the oil and gas lease extended the lease through October 30,
2009, and none of those clauses prevented the expiration of the lease as to
the southwest quarter.29
Citation contended that the court misinterpreted the terms of the lease,
that the Pugh clause did not apply, and that the lease was held in force as to
all of the lands described in the lease by operation of the drilling operations
clause.30 Specifically, Citation argued (a) that the above-quoted Pugh
clause expressly provides that it is only operative at the end of the one-year
period following the end of the primary term of the lease, (b) that the
conditions required in order for the Pugh clause to effect the expiration of
the lease as to the southwest quarter were not met because, at the end of that
one-year period after the primary term, the southwest quarter was included
in a producing unit, and (c) that the first sentence of the Pugh clause makes
that clause operative only one time—i.e., on July 15, 1990, one year after
the end of the primary term, when the southwest quarter was held by
production.31
On appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court agreed that the first
sentence of the Pugh clause focuses on the first year after the expiration of
the primary term. However, it found that Citation “fail[ed] to consider the
rest of the paragraph.”32 The court concluded that when the Pugh clause is

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id. ¶ 15.
Id. ¶ 7, 848 N.W.2d at 695.
Id. ¶ 11, 848 N.W.2d at 696.
Id. ¶ 16, 848 N.W.2d at 697-98.
Id. ¶ 17, 848 N.W.2d at 698.
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read as a whole,33 it provides that the lease would expire at the end of each
successive one-year period after the primary term as to lands not included in
a producing unit, unless additional drilling operations attributable to the
non-producing lands were conducted during that one-year period.34 As a
result, the lease expired as to the southwest quarter by operation of the Pugh
clause.
The court addressed one particularly interesting contract interpretation
issue while reaching its opinion. Both the Pugh clause and the drilling
operations clause stated that they applied notwithstanding any contrary
provision in the lease. However, the court found the two provisions to be in
conflict.35 This presented the dilemma of how a court should give effect to
language in a contract that states that each of two clauses that conflict with
each other are to be given superseding and controlling effect over all other
provisions of the contract. Which provision truly controls over the other?
The North Dakota Supreme Court cited the contract and oil and gas
lease interpretation principles that generally provide that (a) contracts are,
to the extent possible, interpreted in a way that gives effect to every
provision of the contract if reasonably practicable, and (b) oil and gas leases
are “often construed most favorably to the lessor because the lessee usually
drafts the lease and has more experience drafting the lease to give himself
an advantage.”36 Finding that Pugh clauses are generally included to
protect the lessor, the court observed that if it interpreted the two provisions
the way Citation advocated, “the drilling operations clause would supersede
the Pugh clause and the Pugh clause would become meaningless.”37
Because of those considerations, and in order to give effect to both
provisions of the lease, the court concluded that the Pugh clause modified
the drilling operations clause.38
Finally, the court distinguished its prior ruling in Egeland v.
Continental Resources, Inc.39 in which the court ruled in favor of the lessee
in a similar dispute over the interplay between the Pugh clause and the
drilling operations clause of a lease. The court in Tank observed that
“[b]ecause Pugh clauses vary widely in form, the interpretation of how a

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id.
Id. ¶ 18.
Id. ¶ 27, 848 N.W.2d at 700.
Id. ¶ 28 (citing West v. Alpar Res., Inc., 298 N.W.2d 484, 490-91 (N.D. 1980)).
Id.
Id.
2000 ND 169, ¶ 31, 616 N.W.2d 861, 870-71.
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Pugh clause may affect other provisions in a lease may also vary.”40
Because the language of the lease provisions in Egeland varied from the
provisions at issue in Tank, the court found the analysis in Egeland
inapplicable.41 Accordingly, the court affirmed the ruling of the district
court granting summary judgment in favor of the mineral owner.
III. NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT DETERMINES WHETHER
OTHER OWNERS AND SUCCESSOR OPERATOR ARE LIABLE
TO THE ROYALTY OWNERS IN A UNIT FOR ROYALTIES
OWED PRIOR TO THE BANKRUPTCY OF THE FORMER
OPERATOR
In Van Sickle v. Hallmark Associates, Inc.,42 the plaintiffs (the “Van
Sickles”) owned royalty interests in the Missouri Breaks Unit No. 1 well.43
Comanche Oil was the original lessee and operator of the four underlying
oil and gas leases.44 However, it later assigned the leases to Alpha Gas
Corp., who became the successor operator.45 Alpha later conveyed an
approximate fifty percent of the working interest rights in the leases to other
parties (the “Interest Holders”).46
In 2002, Alpha filed for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the United
States Bankruptcy Code.47 In 2005, the Bankruptcy Court confirmed and
approved a plan of reorganization, which provided for the formation of an
entity named Missouri Breaks, LLC and the transfer of Alpha’s
approximate fifty percent working interest in the subject well to that
entity.48 The plan required that Missouri Breaks pay Alpha’s creditors in
accordance with the terms of the plan using the revenue from its working
interest rights.49 The plan required that, in order to receive payment, the
creditors had to file a claim in the bankruptcy proceedings.50

40. Tank, ¶ 32, 848 N.W.2d at 701.
41. Id.
42. 2013 ND 218, 840 N.W.2d 92. It should be noted that the opinion in this case was
issued on November 25, 2013. However, proceedings on a request for rehearing continued into
2014, so that this case is considered appropriate for inclusion in this paper that focuses on 2014
litigation.
43. Id. ¶ 3, 840 N.W.2d at 96.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-74 (2012)).
48. Id. ¶ 4.
49. Id.
50. Id.
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The Van Sickles “did not file a claim with the bankruptcy court, and
neither the plan nor the bankruptcy court’s final order included their
claim.”51 However, it was also undisputed that the Van Sickles “were not
listed as creditors in Alpha’s bankruptcy case . . . [and] had no notice of
Alpha’s bankruptcy proceedings . . . .”52 The evidence in the case showed
that Missouri Breaks had made certain royalty payments to the Van Sickles
after confirmation of the plan of reorganization.
In 2006, the Van Sickles sued the Interest Holders and Missouri
Breaks—who collectively owned the full working interest in the oil and gas
leases—for unpaid royalties. The Van Sickles asserted claims of
conversion, intentional tortious interference, and breach of contract.53 They
also sued for royalties on oil and gas produced prior to the confirmation of
the plan of reorganization.54 Extensive district court and appellate
proceedings followed, as detailed in the opinion of the court. Those
proceedings ultimately led to the appeal in which the North Dakota
Supreme Court addressed a series of issues.
First, on the issue of whether Missouri Breaks was liable for Alpha’s
debts under the state-law doctrine of successor liability, the court noted that
“[t]he long-established general rule is that a corporation which purchases
the assets of another corporation does not succeed to the liabilities of the
selling corporation.”55 However, the court noted several exceptions to this
general rule, including situations in which “there is an express or an implied
agreement to assume the transferor’s liability.”56 In the present case, the
court found that, under section 5.2 of the plan of reorganization, “Missouri
Breaks ‘expressly assumed’ the four leases under which the well
operates.”57 Under 11 United States Code section 365(b), Missouri Breaks’
assumption of the leases carried with it “the requirement to cure any
defaults in the unexpired leases.”58 The court concluded that Alpha’s prior
failure to pay royalties was a default under the oil and gas leases that

51. Id. (citing Van Sickle v. Hallmark & Assocs., Inc., 2008 ND 12, ¶ 14, 744 N.W.2d 532,
537).
52. Id.
53. Id. ¶ 5.
54. Id.
55. Id. ¶ 20, 840 N.W.2d at 99 (quoting Benson v. SRT Commc’ns, Inc., 2012 ND 58, ¶ 20,
813 N.W.2d 552, 559).
56. Id. at 100 (quoting Downtowner, Inc. v. Acrometal Products, Inc., 347 N.W.2d 118, 121
(N.D. 1984)).
57. Id. ¶ 23, 840 N.W.2d at 100-01.
58. Id. ¶ 24, 840 N.W.2d at 101.
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needed to be cured upon Missouri Breaks’ assumption of the leases and
succession to Alpha’s ownership.59
Second, the court rejected the defendants’ assertion that Missouri
Breaks received Alpha’s oil and gas leases “free and clear” from Alpha’s
debts prior to the confirmation of the plan of reorganization “because the
Van Sickles did not receive notice of the bankruptcy proceedings and the
confirmation order and reorganization plan are simply not binding on the
Van Sickles.”60
Third, the court found that under the Bankruptcy Code, a debtor cannot
simply retain the favorable aspects of a contract and avoid the burdensome
provisions of the contract.61 Rather, the debtor must either assume or reject
the entire contract, both benefits and burdens.62 The court observed that
“[t]his is consistent with our state law regarding implied contracts and
assignments.”63 The court concluded that, under the facts presented,
Missouri Breaks “implicitly agreed to assume its statutory liability to the
Van Sickles for the unpaid pre-confirmation royalties, which were not
discharged in the bankruptcy proceedings.”64
IV. CLAIMANTS TO UNRECORDED SEVERED MINERAL
INTEREST CHALLENGE THE VALIDITY OF, AND THE
SURFACE OWNERS’ COMPLIANCE WITH, NORTH DAKOTA’S
ABANDONED MINERAL STATUTES
In Capps v. Weflen,65 the North Dakota Supreme Court addressed an
appeal of a proceeding involving the application of the state’s abandoned
mineral statutes66 to a mineral interest conveyed by a 1979 mineral deed
that was not recorded until 2009. The defendants (the Weflens), owners of
property in which the plaintiffs continued to claim ownership of the
long-unrecorded mineral interest, followed through with the various steps
and procedures required by the abandoned mineral statutes in order to
acquire ownership of the alleged abandoned mineral interest.67 The attempt
to claim ownership began with the publication, on December 28, 2005, of

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. ¶ 29, 840 N.W.2d at 102.
Id. ¶ 31, 840 N.W.2d at 103.
Id. ¶ 32.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 37, 840 N.W.2d at 105.
2014 ND 201, 855 N.W.2d 637.
See N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-18.1-06 (2013).
Capps, ¶ 3, 855 N.W.2d at 640.
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the first in a series of notices of the lapse of the mineral interest and
culminated in the recordation of a termination of mineral interest, affidavit
of publication, affidavit of mailing, and notice of lapse of mineral interest in
the real estate records on March 6, 2006.68
While on a trip to the area in 2008, the spouse of one of the plaintiffs
(the Capps) “noticed oil wells in the area of the Weflens’ property.”69
Concerned with that oil and gas development, the Capps filed a statement of
claim in 2008.70 In 2009, the Capps recorded the 1979 mineral deed and
sued the Weflens to quiet title to the mineral interest.71 The district court
found that the Weflens had no claim to the mineral interest of the Capps
because the Weflens had failed to comply with the notice requirements
specified in the abandoned mineral statutes.72 The Weflens appealed that
ruling.
The North Dakota Supreme Court, beginning its review of the district
court’s order granting summary judgment against the Weflens on the
ground that they failed to comply with the notice provisions of the
abandoned mineral statutes, noted that “[t]here is no dispute that the subject
mineral interests were unused for more than 20 years within the meaning of
[North Dakota Century Code section] 38-18.1-03, and that no statement of
claim was filed within 60 days after first publication of the notice of
lapse.”73 However, the lower court found that the Weflens failed to comply
with the statutes:
The district court listed three reasons why the Weflens failed to
comply with the statutory provisions: 1) the Weflens “had
knowledge that Ruth Nelson was dead at the time they mailed” the
notice of lapse to her addresses of record, and “[m]ailing notice to
a dead person at their address of record is absurd;” 2) “[m]ailing
notice certified, restricted delivery is not required and mailing
notice to a dead person by certified, restrictive delivery guarantees
notice will not be received by the mineral owner;” and 3) because
“property devolves to the deceased’s heirs upon death” under the
provisions of the North Dakota Uniform Probate Code, [North
Dakota Century Code title 30.1], the record owner was no longer
the actual owner, and therefore the actual owner’s address “did not
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id.
Id. ¶ 4.
Id.
Id. at 640-41.
Id. at 641.
Id. ¶ 8, 855 N.W.2d at 642.
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appear of record” which necessitated a “reasonable inquiry” for the
address of the actual mineral interest owner.74
The court reviewed each of the reasons described above and concluded
that the district court’s rationale conflicted with North Dakota Century
Code chapter 38-18.1 and the North Dakota Supreme Court’s
interpretations of those statutes.
First, the court found that it was immaterial whether the Weflens had
actual knowledge of the death of the predecessor in interest to Capps, who
was still the record owner of the mineral interest and the person to whom
the statutory notices had been mailed by the Weflens. The court cited prior
precedent75 rejecting the reasoning behind this first basis for the decision
below, and the court noted that the plaintiff successors to the mineral
interest would have received notice if they had recorded notice of their
current addresses and succession in the real estate records.76 Second, with
respect to the Capps’ contention that Weflens’ use of certified mail with
restricted delivery violated the procedures required under North Dakota
Century Code section 38-18.1-06(2), the court found that the abandoned
mineral statutes do not specify the type of mailing required and do not
forbid the use of any particular type of mailing.77 The Weflens were free to
use certified mail in sending the notice of lapse.78
Third, the court concluded that the district court erred in finding that
the Weflens were obligated to search for heirs of a deceased mineral interest
owner whose address appeared of record in order to fulfill the requirements
of North Dakota Century Code section 38-18.1-06(2).79 Rather, a surface
owner invoking the abandoned mineral statutes is only required to conduct
a reasonable inquiry if the mineral owner’s address does not appear in the
real estate records.80 This is true even where the surface owner has actual
knowledge that the mineral owner whose address appears of record is
deceased.81
The Capps argued, in the alternative, that even if the Weflens were
determined to have complied with the statutory provisions, the notice
provisions of the abandoned minerals statutes violate due process and are
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. ¶ 9, 855 N.W.2d at 642 (brackets appearing in original text).
Id. ¶ 10.
Id. at 643.
Id. ¶ 11, 855 N.W.2d at 643.
Id.
Id. ¶ 12.
Id. ¶ 13, 855 N.W.2d at 644.
Id.
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unconstitutional as applied in this case.82 In support of this contention, the
Capps cited the landmark decision in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &
Trust Co.,83 in which the United States Supreme Court held:
An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any
proceeding which is to be according finality is notice reasonably
calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested
parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an
opportunity to present their objections.84
The district court rejected this contention. While agreeing with the
district court in this respect, the North Dakota Supreme Court, among other
comments, noted the following findings of the United States Supreme Court
in a decision upholding the constitutionality of Indiana’s Mineral Lapse
Act, which is similar to the North Dakota statutes:
The reasoning in Mullane is applicable to a judicial proceeding
brought to determine whether a lapse of a mineral estate did or did
not occur, but not to the self-executing feature of the Mineral
Lapse Act. The due process standards of Mullane apply to an
“adjudication” that is “to be accorded finality.”85
The court reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded the case
for entry of judgment quieting title to the mineral interest in favor of the
Weflens.86
V. NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT FINDS THAT ANY
DEFECT IN MAILING OF REQUIRED NOTICE OF LAPSE OF
MINERAL INTEREST UNDER NORTH DAKOTA’S
ABANDONED MINERALS PROCEDURE WILL NOT DEPRIVE
THE COURT OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER
DEFENDANT IN A SUBSEQUENT QUIET TITLE ACTION
In Peterson v. Estate of Jasmanka,87 the personal representative of the
Estate of Lester Jasmanka, deceased (the “defendant”), appealed the trial
court’s order denying her motion to vacate a 1990 default judgment

82.
83.
84.
85.
(1982)).
86.
87.

Id. ¶ 14.
339 U.S. 306 (1950).
Capps, ¶ 16, 855 N.W.2d at 644-45 (quoting Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314).
Id. ¶ 19, 855 N.W.2d at 646 (quoting Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 535-36
Id. ¶ 24, 855 N.W.2d at 647.
2014 ND 40, 842 N.W.2d 920.
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quieting title to certain mineral interests in the Petersons.88 The underlying
factual background included a 1952 deed under which Jasmanka conveyed
certain property but reserved a fifty-percent mineral interest.89 This deed
listed Jasmanka’s address as “5506 Modoc Avenue in Richmond,
California.”90 In 1959, Jasmanka executed two oil and gas leases that each
listed his address as being “5505 Modoc Avenue”91 in Richmond,
California.92 Both the deed and the leases were recorded.93 The Petersons
owned the surface of the lands underlain by the defendant’s reserved
mineral interest.94 Jasmanka died in California in 1963.95
Thereafter, in 1990, when there had been no use of the minerals for
more than thirty years, the Petersons “published a notice of lapse of mineral
interest in the official county newspaper. The Petersons also mailed a
notice of lapse of mineral interest to [the defendant] at 5505 Modoc
Avenue.”96 The present quiet title suit followed, and the Petersons
continued to use the 5505 Modoc Avenue address for further service on,
and notice to, the defendant. When the defendant filed no response or
appearance in the quiet title suit, the district court entered a default
judgment quieting title in the mineral rights in the Petersons.97
“In 2012, 49 years after Jasmanka’s death and 22 years after entry of
the default judgment quieting title to the minerals in the Petersons,”98 the
defendant moved to vacate the 1990 default judgment quieting title in the
Petersons. The defendant asserted that the 1990 judgment was void
because the Petersons mailed notice of the lapse of the mineral interest to
the wrong address and thus failed the requirements of North Dakota’s
abandoned minerals statute, codified at North Dakota Century Code chapter
38-18.1.99
The defendant further argued that “the Petersons had
fraudulently misrepresented to the court that the 5505 Modoc Avenue
address was the only address of record for Jasmanka,”100 thereby providing
grounds for vacating the default judgment under North Dakota Rule of Civil
88. Id. ¶ 1, 842 N.W.2d at 922.
89. Id. ¶ 2.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. ¶ 3.
95. Id. ¶ 4, 842 N.W.2d at 923.
96. Id. ¶ 3, 842 N.W.2d at 922-23.
97. Id. at 923.
98. Id. ¶ 5, 842 N.W.2d at 923.
99. Id.
100. Id.
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Procedure 60(b)(3). The district court rejected these arguments and denied
the motion to vacate the default judgment.101 The defendant appealed.
After reviewing the detailed procedural statutes relied upon by the
defendant in her appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court described the
defendant’s argument:
[Defendant’s] primary contention on appeal is that the district
court lacked personal jurisdiction to enter the 1990 quiet title
judgment because the Petersons failed to properly serve the notice
of lapse of mineral interest upon Jasmanka, the record owner of
the mineral interest. [The defendant] in effect contends strict
compliance with the notice requirements of the statutory
abandoned minerals procedure under [North Dakota Century Code
section] 38-18.1-06(2) was a jurisdictional prerequisite to a
subsequent quiet title action in district court regarding the disputed
minerals.102
However, the court noted that its prior decisions have recognized “a
clear distinction between the statutory abandoned minerals procedure under
[North Dakota Century Code chapter] 38-18.1 and a subsequent quiet title
action, and have emphasized they are entirely separate, distinct
procedures.”103 The issue of “[p]ersonal jurisdiction in a quiet title action is
determined solely by compliance with the service of process procedures
under [North Dakota Rule of Civil Procedure 4].”104 Thus, the court
rejected the defendant’s attempt to impose the notice requirements under
the abandoned minerals procedure as a jurisdictional prerequisite in a
subsequent quiet title lawsuit.105
The court concluded that any defect that might have occurred “in the
mailing of the notice of lapse of mineral interest did not deprive the district
court of personal jurisdiction” in the quiet title lawsuit.106 Consequently,
because the judgment was not void, the defendant was not entitled to relief
under North Dakota Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4).107
VI. NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT AFFIRMS DECISION BY
THE DISTRICT COURT FINDING THAT WELL OPERATOR’S
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id.
Id. ¶ 11, 842 N.W.2d at 924.
Id. ¶ 13, 842 N.W.2d at 925.
Id. ¶ 14, 842 N.W.2d at 925.
Id.
Id. ¶ 18, 842 N.W.2d at 926.
Id.
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LAWSUIT AND CLAIMS AGAINST LANDOWNERS WERE
WITHOUT REASONABLE CAUSE AND NOT IN GOOD FAITH
The case of Sagebrush Resources, LLC v. Peterson108 involved the
appeal of a summary judgment ruling dismissing with prejudice the lawsuit
Sagebrush Resources filed against the defendant landowners and further
determining that the action was frivolous and not made in good faith and
awarding the landowners attorney fees.109 Sagebrush’s lawsuit against the
landowners asserted, in part, that Sagebrush was the operator of several
wells and related equipment, the landowners wrongfully entered
Sagebrush’s property without permission, and the landowners wrongfully
interfered with Sagebrush’s oil and gas exploration and production
activities.110 Sagebrush stated that its awareness of the alleged trespass was
based upon certain encounters with one or more of the landowners, as well
as its review of complaints and supporting materials the landowners had
submitted to the North Dakota Industrial Commission, which included
photos of the various well sites.111
Sagebrush alleged that it was damaged by the landowners’ actions
because the landowners filed a series of complaints against Sagebrush with
the Industrial Commission alleging violations of the statutes and regulations
that govern oil and gas operations.112 The landowners’ complaints resulted
in investigations by the Commission that required expenditures by
Sagebrush and caused the Commission to “withhold its approval of a
planned sale of Sagebrush’s interests in the affected units, thereby delaying
said sale.”113 The landowners made various assertions in response to
Sagebrush’s claims and further alleged that Sagebrush’s lawsuit was
“frivolous and brought in bad faith for purposes of harassment and
intimidation.”114 The landowners sought attorney fees and costs under
North Dakota Century Code sections 28-26-01 and 28-26-31.115
The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the
landowners on the claims of Sagebrush and additionally found that
“Sagebrush’s lawsuit was frivolous and was not brought in good faith.”116
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

2014 ND 3, 841 N.W.2d 705.
Id. ¶ 1, 841 N.W.2d at 707.
Id. ¶ 2.
Id.
Id. ¶ 4, 841 N.W.2d at 708.
Id.
Id. ¶ 3.
Id.
Id. ¶ 10, 841 N.W.2d at 710.
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The court awarded the landowners $23,729 in attorney fees.117 Sagebrush
did not appeal the summary judgment ruling dismissing its claims against
the landowners. However, Sagebrush appealed the district court’s award of
attorney fees and the finding that its claims were frivolous and not made in
good faith.118
The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decision
and made the following rulings: Sagebrush did not establish a valid
trespass claim. Under North Dakota law, an oil and gas lessee holds an
easement in the surface estate for purposes of developing the minerals.119
An easement is a non-possessory interest in land.120 The essence of a
trespass to real property is interference with possession of land.121 With
regard to a possible claim for trespass to chattels, the court found that the
landowners’ alleged complaints to the Industrial Commission did not
constitute harm sufficient to support such a claim.122 Second, with regard
to Sagebrush’s claim for injunctive relief enjoining the landowners from
interfering with its operation of the lease, the evidence showed that
Sagebrush had already sold and assigned its interest in the subject lease to
another company as of the time it filed the present lawsuit.123
Last, under the deferential standard of review that applied in this
appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded that the “district court
did not misapply the law or act arbitrarily, unreasonably, or unconscionably
in deciding that”124 Sagebrush had asserted claims “without reasonable
cause, not in good faith, and found to be untrue.”125 Chief Justice
VandeWalle, specially concurring in the affirmance of the district court,
stated his belief that “the oil and gas lessee does have the right and perhaps
the responsibility to keep people, including the surface owner, off of
dangerous property the lessee is using to product the oil and gas . . . .”126
However, Chief Justice VandeWalle found the evidence supported the
conclusion that, “for retaliatory reasons, Sagebrush attempted to restrict the
defendants beyond what was necessary to accomplish safety purposes.”127
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id. ¶ 12, 841 N.W.2d at 711.
Id. ¶ 13.
Id. ¶ 20, 841 N.W.2d at 713 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 19.
Id. ¶ 25, 841 N.W.2d at 714.
Id. ¶ 26, 841 N.W.2d at 715.
Id.
Id. ¶ 34, 841 N.W.2d at 715-16 (VandeWalle, C.J., specially concurring).
Id. at 716.
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VII. FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT PRESENTED WITH DISPUTE
BETWEEN SURFACE OWNERS AND OPERATOR OVER THE
OPERATOR’S ASSERTED RIGHT TO DRILL A SALT WATER
DISPOSAL WELL ON LANDS WITHIN A PRODUCTION UNIT
Finally, this discussion of state court decisions will conclude with one
federal court opinion that dealt with a series of principles of North Dakota
oil and gas laws. The case of Fisher v. Continental Resources, Inc.128
involved a tract of land in which the surface rights were owned by the
Fishers and on which Continental proposed to construct and operate a salt
water disposal well (the “SWD well”). Beginning on October 26, 2011 and
continuing through October 1, 2012, Continental personnel and contract
landmen sent the Fishers a series of five letters advising of Continental’s
plans to drill on the Fishers’ property; some of the letters referenced a
proposed SWD well, while others referenced the drilling of an oil and gas
well.129 On May 20, 2013, Continental received a permit from the North
Dakota Industrial Commission authorizing it to operate the SWD well for
salt water disposal purposes.130 Continental thereafter drilled the SWD well
and laid a pipeline across the subject lands to transport saltwater from the
well.131
In July of 2013, the Fishers sued Continental and asserted that
Continental had no legal right to construct and operate a salt water disposal
well and pipeline on their property and no right to dispose of salt water in
the pore space beneath the surface of the subject tract.132 The Fishers
alleged claims of nuisance, trespass, fraudulent representation, and deceit.
Continental contended that both North Dakota law and the applicable unit
agreement for the Cedar Hills North Red River “B” Unit, which included
the Fisher’s property, authorized its activities even though it did not have a
salt water disposal agreement in place with the Fishers.133 Continental filed
a counterclaim seeking a judicial declaration that its disputed activities were
authorized.134 Before the district court was Continental’s motion for
summary judgment.135

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

No.1:13-cv-097, 2014 WL 4410206, at *1 (D.N.D. Sept. 8, 2014).
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The court began its discussion of applicable law with the recognition
that the mineral estate in North Dakota is dominant in relation to a severed
surface estate because the mineral owner has an implied right to use so
much of the surface estate as is reasonably necessary to explore, develop,
and transport the minerals.136 The court went on to observe that the North
Dakota Supreme Court has adopted the “accommodation doctrine” to
determine issues of reasonable use:
The test for reasonableness under the “accommodation doctrine”
requires a consideration of all the pertinent circumstances
including what are the usual, customary, and reasonable practices
in the industry, and the nature, condition, location, and current use
of the servient estate . . . [W]hether the use of the surface estate by
the mineral estate is reasonable is a question of fact.137
The court recognized that under the North Dakota statutes138 the
surface owners must be compensated for damages to the surface estate
made in conjunction with oil and gas drilling operations.139
Seeking summary judgment in its favor, Continental asserted that the
SWD well and related pipeline were reasonably necessary, and indeed
required, for the development of the mineral estate within the unit,
including the minerals underlying the Fisher property.140 The company also
contended that the language in the unit agreement establishing the rights
and obligations of the unit operator contemplated salt water disposal
operations.141 However, the Fishers argued that salt water disposal
activities were separate and distinct from oil and gas exploration and
production and could not constitute a reasonable use of the surface.142 The
court noted that no prior North Dakota court decisions directly addressed
the issue of whether a unit operator has the general and implied right to
construct and operate a salt water disposal well as part of unit operations.143
The court observed that it was not clear from the record whether the
minerals underlying this tract of land had been leased, although it
recognized that the owner of the mineral rights in that tract would clearly be
entitled to a share of unit production by virtue of the applicable unit
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Id.
Id. at *4 (citing Hunt Oil Co. v. Kerbaugh, 283 N.W.2d 131, 136-37 (N.D. 1979)).
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agreement.144 Without an oil and gas lease, the court noted that it would
look to the North Dakota statutes authorizing unitization, the unit
agreement, and the unit operating agreement.145 After reviewing those
sources of the operator’s rights in conducting unit operations, the court
held:
Section 38-08-09.8 of the North Dakota Century Code, the
unitization order, the Unit Agreement, and the Unit Operating
Agreement are broad enough to be read as including an implied
covenant to drill a salt water disposal well within the Unit in order
to dispose of salt water produced by Unit operations. Thus, as
long as Continental Resources acts in a reasonable manner and
does not use the [SWD] well to dispose of salt water produced
outside of the Unit, its actions are not considered unlawful.146
However, the court further explained that, under North Dakota law, the
question of whether a particular activity and use of the land is reasonable
depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case (e.g., whether
reasonable alternatives are available).147 The court concluded that genuine
issues of material fact remained in dispute or were unknown and that
Fisher’s trespass and nuisance claims could not be decided at this stage of
the proceedings through summary judgment procedure.148
With respect to their additional claims for fraudulent misrepresentation
and deceit, the Fishers asserted that Continental’s notice letters were
unclear as to whether Continental intended to drill a new oil and gas well
or, instead, a salt water disposal well.149 Continental responded that the
letters were not misleading and, even if the letters were misleading, the
Fishers could not demonstrate the required element of reliance on the
letters.150 The court found that, by statute,151 the Fishers were “entitled to
‘sufficient disclosure of the plan of work and operations to enable the
surface owner to evaluate the effect of drilling operations on the surface
owner’s use of the property.’”152 The court also found that while the
Fishers “may have a number of difficult hurdles at trial to demonstrate that
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
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Continental intended to deceive them,”153 it could not dispose of the
fraudulent misrepresentation and deceit claims and could not find that
reliance could not be shown through a summary judgment ruling.154
Finally, Continental alleged the Fishers had not properly pled a claim
for surface damages under North Dakota Century Code section 38.11.1-04;
the Fishers responded that the request for monetary damages in their
complaint encompassed a claim for statutory damages.155 The court first
found that the Fisher’s complaint was sufficient to include the claim and
that Continental would not be prejudiced by the complaint being so
construed.156 The court additionally observed that whether North Dakota
Century Code section 38-11.1-04 encompasses the determination of
damages for use of the pore space underlying the surface of the affected
tract remains an undecided issue under North Dakota law.157 The court
declined to resolve that unsettled question at this point in the proceedings,
and it denied Continental’s motion for summary judgment.158

153.
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